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John C. Yoot
Even as it brought the 2000 presidential election to conclusion,
Bush v Gore' gave rise to a flurry of attacks on the legitimacy of the
Supreme Court. Many scholars criticized the Court for its creation of
a new Equal Protection Clause claim never before seen, for its sudden
imposition of a deadline that foreclosed any remedy, for its apparent
hypocrisy in intervening into a local election dispute, and for its inter-
vention into an utterly partisan dispute. Criticism usually would come
as no surprise-it is merely the standard discussion about the actions
of the institution that is the focus of much of our work in academia.
While early opinion polls show that most Americans have de-
cided to move on,2 it seems that many academic critics of Bush v Gore
have decided to go beyond the usual mulling over of Supreme Court
opinions. In the weeks following the Court's decision, prominent legal
academics have voiced a number of objections that question the
Court's very legitimacy, and in some cases have urged the political sys-
tem to attack the Court. Many have characterized the decision as par-
tisan and ungrounded in law.' Some have even compared the justices
to partisan lobbyists. 4 As a result, these critics have called upon the
Senate to refuse to confirm any Supreme Court justices during Presi-
dent Bush's term,' while others have hit upon the idea of reducing the
number of justices on the Court.6 Some have even gone so far as to
compare the Court's alleged loss of legitimacy today to the Court's
t Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall). Dur-
ing the Florida election crisis, the author testified before a special committee of the Florida legis-
lature concerning the state's options for choosing its presidential electors. I thank Jesse Choper
and Phil Frickey for their comments.
I Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct 525 (2000) (per curiam).
2 Even though a bare majority of Americans initially agreed with the Court's ruling in
Bush v Gore, 80 percent of respondents to a CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll conducted on De-
cember 13, 2000, accepted Bush as the legitimate winner of the 2000 presidential election. David
W. Moore, Eight in Ten Americans to Accept Bush as "Legitimate" President, Gallup News Ser-
vice (Dec 14,2000), available online at <http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr001214.asp> (vis-
ited Feb 22,2001).
3 See, for example, Akhil Amar, The Supreme Court: Should We Trust Judges?, LA Times
M1 (Dec 17, 2000) ("[Tlhis is not the rule of law: It is the rule of subjective sensibility.").
4 See, for example, Bruce Ackerman, The Court Packs Itself, Am Prospect 48 (Feb 12,
2001), available online at <http://www.prospect.org/print/Vl2/3/ackerman-b.html> (visited
March 29,2001).
5 See id.
6 Neal Katyal, Politics Over Principle, Wash Post A35 (Dec 14,2000).
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decision in Dred Scott, with all of the dire consequences that it por-
tended .
Much of this enflamed rhetoric, while good for grabbing head-
lines, no doubt resulted from the heat of the moment rather than from
careful reflection and thought. But even if this criticism is shallow, it is
broad. At least 585 law professors took the unusual step of signing an
ad published in the New York Times on January 13, 2001, decrying
Bush v Gore as an illegitimate, political decision." The ad flatly de-
clared: "when a bare majority of the U.S. Supreme Court halted the
recount of ballots under Florida law, the five justices were acting as
political proponents for candidate Bush, not as judges."9
Heady words. Such extraordinary criticism raises some questions
worth pursuing. Did the Supreme Court somehow render an "illegiti-
mate" decision in Bush v Gore? Has the Court undermined the insti-
tutional legitimacy that allows it to play a central role in American
politics and society? What is the real threat to the Court's legitimacy
in the aftermath of Bush v Gore?
This Essay will argue that concerns about the Court's legitimacy
are overblown. While it is certainly too early to be sure, the Court's ac-
tions, and their impact on the political system, come nowhere close to
approaching the circumstances that surrounded earlier, real threats to
the Court's standing. The Court did not decide any substantive is-
sues-on a par with abortion or privacy rights, for example-that call
upon the Court to remain continually at the center of political contro-
versy for years. Instead, the Court issued a fairly narrow decision in a
one-of-a-kind case-the procedures to govern presidential election
counts-that is not likely to reappear in our lifetimes. Rather than act-
ing hypocritically and lawlessly, the Court's decision to bring the Flor-
ida election dispute to a timely, and final, end not only restored stabil-
ity to the political system but was also consistent with the institutional
role the Court has shaped for itself over the last decade.
I. LEGITIMACY As PUBLIC OPINION
Legitimacy is a word often used in our political debate, but sel-
dom defined precisely. We can think of institutional "legitimacy" as
7 Id, discussing Scott v Sanford, 60 US 393 (1857).
8 On the problems with academics participating in such group letters or ads, see Neal
Devins, Bearing False Witness: The Clinton Impeachment and the Future of Academic Freedom,
148 U Pa L Rev 165, 185-90 (1999) (warning of irrelevancy, loss of academic freedom, and re-
duced funding resulting from politically motivated letter writing).
9 Dave Zweifel, Court Decision Still Rankles Law Profs, Capital Times 6A (Jan 24,2001)
(reprinting text of ad).
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the belief in the binding nature of an institution's decisions, even when
one disagrees with them.'0 This sociological or even psychological
definition of the term is concerned with whether people will think the
Court's decision in Bush v Gore was legitimate, and as a result will
obey it." It is different from philosophical legitimacy, in which one is
concerned with moral obligations to follow the law.2 Our Weberian
definition of legitimacy is also different than the manner in which
Critical Legal Studies scholars use the phrase to argue that because
the legal system is radically indeterminate, and produces unjust results,
it is illegitimate.'3
One way, then, to judge whether Bush v Gore has undermined
the Court's institutional legitimacy in American society would be to
examine public attitudes toward the Court. Studies have shown that
public support for the Court and its role in society run high, even
though many have little knowledge about the Court's day-to-day ac-,
tivities.4 While this is not the place to conduct a detailed study," we
may perhaps draw some initial conclusions from recent Gallup polling
data. Over the last decade, poll respondents have usually held more
confidence in the Supreme Court than in the other two branches of
government.6 In June 2000, 47 percent of those polled said that they
held either a "great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in the Su-
preme Court, versus 42 percent for the presidency and 24 percent for
Congress." Even in light of the usual caveats surrounding the use of
polling data, the resiliency in the Court's public support has been rela-
tively deep and wide,'8 even as it has rendered a series of controversial
10 Legitimacy in this sense is composed of both a belief that an institution's command is
obligatory, and an action in compliance. See Max Weber, 1 Economy and Society 31-33 (Bedmin-
ster 1968). See also Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 Wisc
L Rev 379,381-82 (discussing Weber's analysis of "legitimacy").
11 See Tom R. Tyler and Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discre-
tionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 Duke L J 703,
711 n 25 (1994) (comparing sociological and philosophical notions of legitimacy).
12 See, for example, Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 190-215 (Belknap 1986); Joseph Raz,
The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality 1-27 (Clarendon 1979).
13 See Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 Cal L Rev 283,285 (1989).
14 See, for example, Walter F. Murphy and Joseph Tanenhaus, Publicity, Public Opinion,
and the Court, 84 Nw U L Rev 985, 1019 (1990) ("[A]nalyses show there is no necessary connec-
tion between knowledge and support for the Court.").
15 Political scientists have conducted several excellent studies about the relationship be-
tween public opinion and the Supreme Court. See, for example, Thomas R. Marshall, Public
Opinion and the Supreme Court (Unwin Hyman 1989); Gregory A. Caldeira, Public Opinion and
the U.S. Supreme Court: FDR's Court-Packing Plan, 81 Am Pol Sci Rev 1139 (1987).
16 Confidence in Institutions, available online at <http://www.gallup.com/poll/indicators/
indconfidence.asp> (visited Feb 23,2001).
17 Id.
18 Over the past ten years, the percentage of respondents who indicated that they had a
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decisions ranging from affirmative action to abortion to civil rights to
religion.
Bush v Gore has not changed those overall numbers significantly.
According to the Gallup poll, 59 percent of adults in January 2001 ap-
proved of the way the Supreme Court was handling its job, down only
slightly from 62 percent in late August 2000." While the Court's over-
all approval ratings have barely changed, however, the partisan com-
position of those numbers may be cause for concern. Approval of the
Supreme Court among Republicans jumped from 60 percent in Au-
gust 2000 to 80 percent by January 2001; among Democrats, that num-
ber fell from 70 percent in August to 42 percent in January.2 0 But what
may be most important is independents; there the Court's approval
ratings dropped marginally from 57 to 54 percent." While it is too
early to tell whether this partisan split in attitudes toward the Court
will undermine the Court's legitimacy, I think it more likely that the
drop in Democratic opinions toward the Court will prove to be a tem-
porary blip, for the reasons that follow.
II. LEGITIMACY As HISTORY
A second way to approach the question of legitimacy would be to
compare Bush v Gore to other historical periods in which the Court's
authority has come into question. If the Court's actions today were
similar in significant ways to earlier moments of challenge to judicial
legitimacy, then we might predict that the changes in the immediate
"great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence averages to 45.8 percent, with a low of 39 percent, and
a high of 50 percent. Id.
19 Wendy W. Simmons, Election Controversy Apparently Drove Partisan Wedge into Atti-
tudes Towards Supreme Court, available online at <http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/
prO10116.asp> (visited Feb 23,2001).
20 Id.
21 Id. A tentative study of public opinion on the Supreme Court and the 2000 election con-
ducted by political scientists reaches similar conclusions. They find that a majority of Americans
approve of the Court's decision and believe it to have been fair. They also find that Democrats
are far more likely to disapprove of the Court's decision and to view it as unfair than Republi-
cans. See James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira, and Lester K. Spence, The Supreme Court and
the 2000 Presidential Election, unpublished manuscript, available online at <http://artsci.wusti.
edu/-legit/research.html> (visited Apr 27, 2001). Another study by the same authors finds that
the Court has not damaged its legitimacy with Bush v Gore. After the Court's decision, they find
that more than 80 percent of the public remains supportive of the Court, that more than 75 per-
cent believe the Court can be trusted, and that about 85 percent would obey the Court even if
they disagreed with its decisions. The authors compared their data to 1987 and 1995 polls and
found that, if anything, support among the public for the Court has increased. See James L. Gib-
son, Gregory A. Caldeira, and Lester K. Spence, The Legitimacy of the US. Supreme Court, un-
published manuscript, available online at <http://artsci.wustl.edu/-legit/research.html> (visited
Apr 27, 2001). As these political scientists conclude from the polling data, "support for the Court
does not seem to have been depressed by its involvement in the 2000 presidential election." Id.
I
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polling data may augur a more sustained attack on the Court. Evaluat-
ing Bush v Gore in light of earlier historical periods, however, suggests
that any sustained assault on the Court's legitimacy is unlikely to arise.
The Court's authority has come under serious question four times in
our history: the Marshall Court, the Taney Court's decision in Dred
Scott, the Court's early resistance to the New Deal, and the Warren
Court's fight against segregation and its expansion of individual liber-
ties. Close inspection of these periods show that they bear little re-
semblance to Bush v Gore.
The defining characteristic of several of these periods was the
persistent, central role of the Court in the political disputes of the day.
The New Deal period is perhaps the most obvious in this regard. In an
effort to end the Great Depression, President Franklin Roosevelt and
a Democratic Congress enacted economic regulatory legislation that
sought to impose national solutions on the crisis. In cases such as
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp v United States2 and Carter v Carter
Coal Co," the Court invalidated New Deal laws as beyond Congress's
Commerce Clause power. These cases followed upon a series of deci-
sions during the Progressive Era that also had restricted the scope of
Congress's powers to regulate the economy. 2 By the time of the 1936
presidential election, the Court had struck down six federal laws that
formed part of FDR's effort to bring about economic recovery. The
Supreme Court came to be seen as one of the last obstacles. Similarly,
during the Warren Court period, the Court not only decided Brown v
Board of Education,"2 but also remained in the forefront of the public's
attention with other desegregation cases. 6
In both periods, the Court intervened into the most pressing sub-
stantive issues of the day-economic depression and race, among oth-
ers-and did so repeatedly over a course of years. Even during the
Marshall Court period, in which the decisions might be considered
more structural-the existence of judicial review,7 Congress's Neces-
sary and Proper Clause power,8 the Commerce Clause power 29- than
substantive, the Court remained at the center stage of national politics
22 295 US 495 (1935).
23 298 US 238 (1936).
24 See, for example, Hammer v Dagenhart, 247 US 251 (1918).
25 347 US 483 (1954).
26 Brown v Board of Education ("Brown I"), 349 US 294 (1955); Boiling v Sharpe, 347 US
497 (1954); Cooper v Aaron, 358 US 1 (1958); Griffin v County School Board, 377 US 218 (1964);
Green v County School Board, 391 US 430 (1968).
27 Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
28 M'Culloch v Maryland, 17 US (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
29 Gibbons v Ogden, 22 US (9 Wheat) 1 (1824).
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for several years. Only in Dred Scott'o can the Court be said to have
decisively acted only once to settle a national issue. In invalidating the
Missouri Compromise, however, that one intrusion represented the
Court's effort to end a divisive national debate that had been the cen-
tral issue in American politics for several generations.
The nature of the Court's interference in these issues almost in-
evitably sparked a response by the other actors in the political system.
In the case of the Marshall Court, it was Jefferson's muttered threats
to defy judicial orders.31 With the Taney Court, it was Abraham Lin-
coln's attacks on Dred Scott and, ultimately, the coming of the Civil
War."2 With the New Deal Court, President Roosevelt responded by
campaigning against the Court and introducing his famous Court-
packing plan." With the Warren Court, it was resistance throughout
the southern states, criticism in Congress, and criticism from presiden-
tial candidates.* The response of the political branches or the states
demonstrates that the Court had acted in a manner that threatened its
own legitimacy. Because the Court had sought to foreclose society (or
parts of it) from using the lawmaking process to achieve certain ends,
and because those ends were of such intense importance to the peo-
ple, the chief if not only way for the people (or interest groups, if one
prefers a public choice approach to the political process) to pursue
their policy preferences was to attack the Court. In other words, the
other political actors had to undermine the Court's legitimacy as an
institution so as to convince the electorate to support efforts to evade
or overturn its decisions.
Contrast these periods with Bush v Gore. In Bush v Gore, the
Court sought to resolve a narrow legal issue involving the selection of
presidential electors. The question bears no constitutional implications
for the resolution of any significant and ongoing social issues of to-
day-abortion, race relations, education, social security, defense. The
decision poses no bar to a society that seeks to use the democratic
30 Scott v Sanford ("Dred Scott"), 60 US 393 (1857).
31 For my own discussion of one instance during this period, see John C. Yoo, The First
Claim: The Burr Trial, United States v. Nixon, and Presidential Power, 83 Minn L Rev 1435, 1451
(1999).
32 See, for example, The Dred Scott Decision: Speech at Springfield, Illinois, June 26, 1857,
in Roy . Basler, ed, Abraham Lincoln: His Speeches and Writings 354-65 (World 1946).
33 William E. Leuchtenburg, The Supreme Court Reborn: The Constitutional Revolution in
the Age of Roosevelt 82-162 (Oxford 1995).
34 Such resistance prevented school desegregation from taking hold in the South for more
than a decade after Brown. See Gerald Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About
Social Change? 74-93 (Chicago 1991). Recent work suggests that the Warren Court did not act
out of step with the political branches. See Lucas A. Powe, The Warren Court and American Poli-
tics 160-78 (Harvard 2000).
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process to resolve any pressing social problems. While the Democratic
party has reason to be dissatisfied with the outcome of Bush v Gore, it
has no interest in challenging the legal reasoning of the decision in the
future. It is highly unlikely that the Court will remain a central player
in future presidential election contests. Indeed, the Court's members
were last involved in a disputed presidential election more than a cen-
tury ago. Further, in Bush v Gore, the Court was not truly deciding a
question of constitutional substance on a par with the scope of abor-
tion rights or the national government's power to enforce civil rights.
Instead, it was only clarifying the rules of the game for selecting the
only federal official elected by the whole nation. It is difficult to con-
ceive of a constitutional question that is more of a pure question of
constitutional structure, rather than of substantive constitutional
rights. Indeed, the Court perhaps was best suited, as a rational deci-
sionmaker, to settle questions involving rules of constitutional process
that may stalemate the other branches of government.
III. LEGITIMACY As IMPARTIALITY
A third way to examine whether Bush v Gore is likely to under-
mine the Court's legitimacy is to look at current theories of the
sources of the Court's authority. The Court itself has sought to give
content to its "legitimacy" in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v Casey.35 In refusing to overrule Roe v Wade,6 a plural-
ity explained that reversing its precedent would undermine the
Court's legitimacy, which it saw as the very source of the judiciary's
authority. "As Americans of each succeeding generation are rightly
told, the Court cannot buy support for its decisions by spending
money and, except to a minor degree, it cannot independently coerce
obedience to its decrees. 37 Thus, the judiciary's power is distinguished
from the use of force or finances, which are the tools of the political
branches. "The Court's power lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a product of
substance and perception that shows itself in the people's acceptance
of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation's law means and
to declare what it demands." Without the sword or purse, the Casey
plurality believes, the Court's authority derives from the public's ac-
ceptance of its power to interpret the Constitution.
35 505 US 833 (1992) (plurality opinion).
36 410 US 113 (1973).
37 Casey, 505 US at 865.
38 Id.
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How does the Court maintain this legitimacy? According to the
Casey plurality, the Court receives its public support by "making le-
gally principled decisions under circumstances in which their princi-
pled character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the Nation."39
In other words, only by acting in a manner that suggests that its deci-
sions are the product of law rather than politics can the Court main-
tain its legitimacy. Therefore, the Court must adhere to settled prece-
dent, lest the public believe that the Court is merely just another po-
litical actor. "[T]o overrule under fire in the absence of the most com-
pelling reason to reexamine a watershed decision would subvert the
Court's legitimacy beyond any serious question."'' Without this legiti-
macy, the Court would be unable to perform its role as interpreter of
the Constitution, which at times may require the Court to act against
the popular will in favor of individual rights.
Leading social scientists appear to agree with the Casey
plurality's notion of judicial legitimacy. The Court's institutional le-
gitimacy both enhances the legitimacy of particular decisions and in-
creases the voluntarily acceptance of unpopular decisions.' Valuable
as it is, however, legitimacy is hard to come by. Political scientists have
emphasized the limited ability of the federal courts to enforce their
decisions, and hence have turned to the Court's legitimacy as an ex-
planation for compliance. 2 The Court's standing is further complicated
43because it lacks any electoral basis for its legitimacy. The way to ac-
quire this legitimacy, many scholars seem to believe, is for the Court to
appear to act neutrally," objectively,5 or fairly" by following standards
of procedural justice or by making decisions that follow principled
rules.
Thus, the question for judging the Court's legitimacy is to evalu-
ate claims that the Rehnquist Court was so intent on achieving parti-
san ends in Bush v Gore that it violated or ignored its own guiding
principles. Two claims are prominently made to suggest that Bush v
39 Id at 866.
40 Id at 867.
41 Tyler and Mitchell, 43 Duke L J at 723 (cited in note 11).
42 See, for example, Murphy and Tanenhaus, 84 Nw U L Rev at 992 (cited in note 14).
43 Gregory A. Caldeira and James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Su-
preme Court, 36 Am J Pol Sci 635,635 (1992).
44 Marshall, Public Opinion at 133 (cited in note 15) ("Justices are viewed as fair, neutral,
and even-handed.").
45 Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 Stan L Rev 739, 744-45 (1982) (ques-
tioning "whether any judicial interpretation can achieve the measure of objectivity required by
the idea of law").
46 Tyler and Mitchell, 43 Duke L J at 746 (cited in note 11) ("[T]he key factor affecting the
perceived legitimacy of authorities is procedural fairness.").
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Gore was inconsistent with the Court's earlier decisions. First, the
Court was acting out of character when it exercised federal power to
intervene in the core state function of running elections. Second, a
Court that has criticized judicial "activism" suddenly interfered in an
especially political process, one fraught with partisanship, and imposed
its own unappealable solution upon the problem. The rest of this Es-
say will examine whether these claims of judicial hypocrisy ring true.
Federalism has become the defining issue of the Rehnquist Court.
To the extent that the current Court has changed American constitu-
tional law, its activities in redefining the balance of power between the
national government and the states will likely prove to be what the
Rehnquist Court is best known for. Much of the Court's recent activ-
ity has been in the sphere of state sovereignty-protecting states as in-
stitutions from federal judicial power through state immunity from
damages actions in federal court 7 and from federal legislative power
through anti-commandeering principles. 4 Last Term's United States v
Morrison"9 underscored yet another element of the Court's federalism
project. In invalidating portions of the Violence Against Women Act, °
Morrison indicates that the Court is serious about limiting national
power itself, regardless of a law's effect on states as institutions. While
the Court has made some important decisions restricting Congress's
powers to expand individual constitutional rights in ways that cannot
be abrogated by states," Morrison declares the Court's firm intention
to restore limits on Congress's basic power to regulate interstate com-
merce as well."
47 See, for example, Alden v Maine, 527 US 706 (1999) (holding that the Eleventh Amend-
ment gives states immunity from suits in state court arising under federal law issued pursuant to
Congress's Article I powers); Seminole Tribe v Florida, 517 US 44 (1995) (holding that the previ-
ously established congressional power to abrogate state immunity is limited to implementation
of the Fourteenth Amendment).
48 See, for example, Printz v United States, 521 US 898 (1997) (striking down a portion of
the Brady Bill on grounds that it conscripted state officials to execute federal law); New York v
United States, 505 US 144 (1992) (overturning a law that required the states either to enact ra-
dioactive waste legislation or take title to the waste).
49 120 S Ct 1740 (2000).
50 Pub L No 103-322, 108 Stat 1941, codified at 42 USC § 13981 (1994).
51 See, for example, Kimel v Florida Board of Regents, 528 US 62 (2000) (holding that
states were not subject to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act under the Eleventh
Amendment); College Savings Bank v Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board,
527 US 666 (1999) (limiting Congress's power to unilaterally abrogate states' sovereign immu-
nity through legislation designed to remediate or prevent constitutional violations under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); City of Boerne v Flores, 521 US 507 (1997) (invalidating the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act as impermissibly expanding the scope of Fourteenth
Amendment protections).
52 While the Court in United States v Lopez, 514 US 549 (1995), struck down a law on
Commerce Clause grounds, many commentators were unsure whether this was to be a one-time
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A principled adherence to federalism, however, does not require
the Court to refuse to review the presidential election procedures
used by the states. Federalism does not create a free-fire zone where
states may do anything they please. Rather, federalism is about the
appropriate balance of power between federal and state authority, so
that neither government abuses its own power at the expense of the
rights of the people.3 By dividing power between the federal and state
governments, and then subjecting each to the separation of powers,
James Madison wrote in Federalist 51, "a double security arises to the
rights of the people. The different governments will controul each
other; at the same time that each will be controuled by itself."
This is nowhere truer than in the area of voting. The Constitution
certainly accords substantial leeway to the states to manage voting in
their own way. As we now know, Article II, Section 1 of the Constitu-
tion declares: "each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legisla-
ture Thereof May Direct, a Number of Electors."" Nonetheless, our
constitutional system today permits substantial federal intervention
into state elections. Congress, for example, has required states to use
single-member districts for congressional elections since 1842.6 The
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution guarantee
the individual right of each citizen to vote on an equal basis and pro-
hibit states from attempting to discriminate against protected groups
by denying them access to the voting booth." Bush v Gore's per cu-
riam holding found that the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of
equal treatment in voting applied not just to access to the ballot box,
58but also to a state's treatment of a vote after it is cast .
Federal courts and the federal government have engaged in
sweeping intervention into state voting procedures. In decisions such
as Baker v Carr"9 and Reynolds v Sims the Court established the
principle of one-person, one-vote. In its recent redistricting cases, such
as Shaw v Reno,1 the Court has held that states cannot use race as a
primary factor in drawing voting districts. Congress has also gotten
into the game. Today, in many areas of the nation, the Voting Rights
event, given certain deficiencies in the federal law at issue there.
53 See John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S Cal L Rev 1311, 1402-04
(1997).
54 Federalist 51 (Madison), in Jacob E. Cooke, ed, The Federalist 351 (Wesleyan 1961).
55 US Const Art II, § 1.
56 Act of June 25, 1842 § 2, 5 Stat 491, codified at 2 USC § 2c (1994).
57 US Const Amend XIV-XV.
58 121 S Ct at 530.
59 369 US 186 (1962).
60 377 US 533 (1964).
61 509 US 630 (1993).
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Act of 1965 prevents states from changing any voting standard, prac-
tice, or procedure without the permission of the Attorney General or
a federal court in Washington, D.C.6' Under this mix of federal laws
and judicial precedents, the Court will hear claims that states have en-
gaged in "vote dilution," where election procedures or redistricting es-
sentially gives more political power to some districts over others.63
Beyond the general federal involvement in state voting proce-
dures, presidential elections specifically implicate a mix of federal and
state laws. The Constitution overrides state constitutions and their al-
location of functions by delegating to state legislatures, specifically, the
power to establish the rules for choosing presidential electors." Fed-
eral law establishes the date on which the presidential election will be
held in every state,6' it allows state legislatures to choose alternative
methods if a choice is not made,66 and federal law explains how Con-
gress will count a state's electoral votes that undergo a challenge. 7
While a state may use judicial methods to resolve these disputes, they
must proceed by rules enacted before the election (the essence of the
Bush suit before the U.S. Supreme Court). Finally, Congress has estab-
lished December 18 as the date that the electors must meet in each
state and send their votes to Washington.
So federal judicial review of state election procedures is nothing
new, not even to the Rehnquist Court. It is certainly not the direct
threat to our federal system of government that some have claimed,
unless they believe that national intervention into state electoral sys-
tems violates the basic structure of our federal system of government.
Indeed, the Court's intervention in the presidential election dispute
was not completely without precedent. While it is true that states have
the discretion to set the manner of the state's appointment of presi-
dential electors, electors are federal, not state, officials chosen in a
federal, not a state, election. When states select officers that play a
federal role, as the Supreme Court announced in US. Term Limits v
Thornton,6' they have a reduced ability to interfere with their activities
or method of selection. In Term Limits, for example, the Court re-
jected arguments that a state's constitutional power to control the
"Times, Places, and Manner" of holding congressional elections al-
62 Voting Rights Act, 42 USC §§ 1973 et seq (1994).
63 Shaw, 509 US at 641.
64 McPherson v Blacker, 146 US 1, 27 (1892).
65 3 USC § 1 (1997).
66 Id§2.
67 Id § 5,15.
68 514 US 779 (1995).
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lowed it to prevent incumbents from appearing on the ballot.6 This
suggests that the state's power over the manner of the selection of
presidential electors cannot go far beyond procedural matters such as
when and where an election is to be held. Once a state began to use
procedures, as in Florida, that may have advantaged one candidate
over another, federal principles justified judicial preservation of the
integrity of the electoral process.
Even if federalism principles did not prevent the Court from re-
solving Bush v Gore, some may criticize the justices because of their
intervention into a deeply political dispute. If not by its deeds, cer-
tainly by its rhetoric, the Rehnquist Court has promoted the idea of
judicial restraint. While yet another phrase that is often used but sel-
dom defined, judicial restraint can be seen generally as a response to
the countermajoritarian difficulty.0 Because judges are not elected
and legislators are, judges should exercise such an undemocratic
power as sparingly as possible-how sparingly and on what subjects,
of course, remains the subject of great debate.7' The last paragraph of
the Bush v Gore per curiam genuflects to this ideal. "None are more
conscious of the vital limits on judicial authority than are the members
of this Court, and none stand more in admiration of the Constitution's
design to leave the selection of the President to the people, through
their legislatures, and to the political sphere."
72
Of course, the majority ran right into the political thickets any-
way. Proponents of judicial restraint might have found the Court's in-
terference surprising, if not wholly unjustified. The Court had avail-
able any number of opportunities to exercise Alexander Bickel's "pas-
sive virtues" 3 to avoid deciding the case, including denying certiorari
in the first Florida election case to come before it,7' or denying the stay
and certiorari in Bush v Gore. Nonetheless, the Court invoked its duty
to decide federal question cases as justification. According to the
Court, "[w]hen contending parties invoke the process of the courts,
however, it becomes our unsought responsibility to resolve the federal
69 Id at 829.
70 For well-known efforts to define and grapple with the countermajoritarian difficulty, see
generally Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process: A Functional Re-
consideration of the Role of the Supreme Court (Chicago 1980); John Hart Ely, Democracy and
Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard 1980); Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous
Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (Yale 2d ed 1986).
71 For a discussion and criticism of the leading theories, see Terri Jennings Peretti, In De-
fense of a Political Court 36-54 (Princeton 1999).
72 Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 533.
73 Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch at 111-98 (cited in note 70).
74 Bush v Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, 121 S Ct 471 (2000) (per curiam).
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and constitutional issues the judicial system has been forced to con-
front."75 Unfortunately, this statement is so vague as to carry almost no
meaning, as it encompasses any number of cases that the Rehnquist
Court would be only too happy to dismiss on grounds of standing" or
the political question doctrine."
Critics of Bush v Gore, however, should not have been surprised
by the Court's lack of restraint. This Court has done everything but
hide behind the passive virtues. It has reaffirmed the right to abortion78
and has placed limits on religion in the public sphere.9 In the federal-
ism area, it has invalidated a series of federal laws in order both to
protect state sovereignty and to limit the powers of the national gov-
ernment. One of the laws, the Violence Against Women Act, passed
Congress by large majorities in both houses of Congress. In the race
area, the Court has invalidated affirmative action in federal contract-
ing ° and struck down redistricting that sought to maximize minority
representation.' On the First Amendment, the Court has invalidated
federal laws so as to expand commercial speech and to protect inde-
cent or pornographic material.8' It has risked confrontation with the
political branches by striking down federal laws solely on the ground
that they violate the separation of powers. Hence, the Court has in-
validated the Line Item Veto Act and reversed an effort to expand
religious freedoms that the Court had cut back.85 This Court has been
anything but shy in flexing its powers of judicial review to intervene in
some of the most contentious issues of the day.
What is important about the Court's recent track record is not
just the frequency of the uses of judicial review, but their quality. Ini-
tially, the Marshall Court in Marbury v Madison grounded judicial re-
view in the Court's unique function in deciding cases or controversies
75 Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 533.
76 See Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555,573-78 (1992).
77 Nixon v United States, 506 US 224,228 (1993).
78 Casey, 505 US 833.
79 Lee v Weisman, 505 US 577,592-93 (1992). The Court, however, also has sought to give
religious groups an equal footing in its participation in government aid programs. Mitchell v
Helms, 530 US 793 (2000) (holding that taxpayer money could be used to buy computers and
other instructional materials for religious schools); Agostini v Felton, 521 US 203 (1997) (allow-
ing publicly paid teachers to be provided to parochial schools to assist disabled students with
remedial, secular education).
80 Adarand Constructors, Inc v Pena, 515 US 200 (1995).
81 Shaw v Reno, 509 US 630 (1993).
82 See, for example, 44 Liquormart, Inc v Rhode Island, 517 US 484 (1996).
83 See, for example, United States v Playboy Entertainment Group, 120 S Ct 1878, 1893
(2000); Reno v American Civil Liberties Union, 521 US 844 (1997).
84 Clinton v New York, 524 US 417 (1998).
85 Flores, 521 US 507.
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that arise under federal law. M As Thomas Jefferson argued, this basis
for judicial review leaves ample room for the coordinate branches of
government to interpret the Constitution in the course of performing
their own constitutional functions.87 Under the Rehnquist Court, this
limited vision of judicial review has steadily been supplanted by asser-
tions of judicial supremacy - that the Supreme Court is not just an in-
terpreter of the Constitution, but the interpreter of the Constitution.'
To be sure, the Court's move toward claiming that its readings of the
Constitution were final, and that they bound the other branches, truly
began with the Burger Court's decision in United States v Nixon,' if
not before.' ° Under the Rehnquist Court, however, the justices have
rapidly expanded their claims to supremacy. In City of Boerne v Flo-
res,9' the Court unanimously declared that Congress could not use its
power to enforce Fourteenth Amendment rights inconsistently with
the Court's interpretation of the scope of those rights. Several cases
have followed that make clear the justices' intentions to stand by Flo-
res's core holding.92
Such assertions of judicial supremacy belie any notions that the
Rehnquist Court generally has followed a course of restraint. If the
Court is willing to go so far as to declare that its power to interpret the
Constitution is supreme over the other branches, certainly it is no
greater a step to intervene in a dispute about non-substantive, rarely-
86 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). See also Robert Lowry Clinton, Marbury v. Madison
and Judicial Review 15-17 (University Press of Kansas 1989); Christopher Wolfe, The Rise of
Modern Judicial Review: From Constitutional Interpretation to Judge-Made Law 80-89 (Basic
1986).
87 See, for example, Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams, Sept 11, 1804, in Paul
L. Ford, ed, 10 Works of Thomas Jefferson 89 n 1 (G.E Putnam's Sons 1905).
88 For my account of this development, see John C. Yoo, Book Review, Choosing Justices: A
Political Appointments Process and the Wages of Judicial Supremacy, 98 Mich L Rev 1436, 1458-
61 (2000).
89 418 US 683 (1974). For sharp criticism of this vision of judicial review, see Michael
Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83
Georgetown L J 217,228-38, 255-62 (1994).
90 Some might argue that the Court first proclaimed its supremacy in Cooper v Aaron, 358
US 1 (1958), in which the Court declared that not only were the Court's opinions the "supreme
Law of the Land," but that the Court was "supreme in the exposition" of the Constitution. Id at
18. Cooper, however, was aimed not at the other branches of government, but at forcing state of-
ficials to follow federal interpretation of the Constitution. See Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme
Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper v. Aaron Revisited, 1982 U Ill L Rev 387,398-403.
91 521 US 507 (1997).
92 See, for example, Dickerson v United States, 530 US 428 (2000) (holding Congress could
not alter Miranda rights); Morrison, 120 S Ct 1740 (striking down the Violence Against Women
Act); Kimel, 528 US 62 (preventing enforcement of the ADA against the states); Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v College Savings Bank, 527 US 627 (1999) (holding
Congress cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity from patent claims).
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used election procedures. Nor should critics of Bush v Gore express
dismay at the role the Court took upon itself in settling the presiden-
tial election dispute. Claims to judicial supremacy bespeak an arro-
gance that the Court has a special role in the American political sys-
tem, one borne not just out of its unique function in deciding cases or
controversies, but out of some vague vision of itself as a final resolver
of national issues. The justices, in other words, have truly come to be-
lieve in Justice Jackson's famous aphorism that "[w]e are not final be-
cause we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are fi-
nal."93 Judicial supremacy has led the Court to view itself not only as
the final interpreter of the Constitution, but also-since as Tocqueville
noted, many political disputes in America eventually become legal
ones-as the nation's final oracle on divisive national controversies.
This should have been apparent from a close reading of Casey,
the same case in which the plurality of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy,
and Souter articulated their theory about the Court's own legitimacy.
In declaring its refusal to overrule Roe v Wade, the plurality equated
the Court's power to interpret the Constitution with the authority to
end divisive national controversies. It is worth quoting the plurality on
this point:
Where, in the performance of its judicial duties, the Court decides
a case in such a way as to resolve the sort of intensely divisive
controversy reflected in Roe and those rare, comparable cases, its
decision has a dimension that the resolution of the normal case
does not carry. It is the dimension present whenever the Court's
interpretation of the Constitution calls the contending sides of a
national controversy to end their national division by accepting a
common mandate rooted in the Constitution."
As Casey suggests, the Court's drive for supremacy reveals an image
of itself as a great healer of national divisions. One need only have re-
placed "abortion" with "presidential election" to see that the Court
would intervene in Bush v Gore.
By reviewing the case, the Supreme Court believed that it could
finally bring an end to the destructive partisan struggle over the presi-
dential election, and could do it in a way that would allow the nation
to accept the final winner's own legitimacy. A look at the alternatives
shows that events threatened to spiral out of control. Any Bush vic-
tory that resulted from the intervention of the Florida legislature or
Congress, while legal, would undoubtedly have been questioned as
93 Brown v Allen, 344 US 443,540 (1953) (Jackson concurring).
94 Casey, 505 US at 866-67.
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driven purely by partisanship. On the other hand, Republicans would
have rejected a Gore victory as the result of ever-changing, subjective
dimple-counting practices of a few local party hacks or the decisions
of a political state judiciary. All of the institutions that could control
the outcome of the election-the legislature, the Florida Secretary of
State, the Florida Supreme Court, the local election officials and Con-
gress-were subject to charges of partisan bias. Although these institu-
tions are popularly elected, their partisan nature might have allowed
the election process to drag on-certainly both Republicans and De-
mocrats demonstrated a willingness in Florida to fight on through
each stage of the electoral college process. No doubt the Court be-
lieved that only it could intervene so as to bring the national election
controversy to an end in a manner that would be accepted by the na-
tion, as indeed it has been.9
This is not to say that the precise reasoning of the per curiam was
utterly correct. I vastly prefer the theory put forward by the Chief Jus-
tice's concurrence: Florida's judiciary had so re-written the state's
electoral laws that it had violated Article II's delegation of authority
to the state legislatures to choose the method for selecting presiden-
tial electors." Indeed, the per curiam's sudden introduction of the De-
cember 12 cutoff date for a remedy-based on the assumption that
the Florida legislature intended to adopt the safe harbor date for the
selection of presidential electors provided for by 3 USC § 5-makes
almost no sense at all unless read in light of the concurrence's struc-
tural analysis. What all of this goes to show, rather, is that in deciding
Bush v Gore the Court was not acting in a hypocritical or partisan
fashion. Instead of contradicting its own cases on federalism or
judicial restraint, the Court acted in keeping with the general trends of
its own jurisprudence over the last decade. The Court's declaration of
its role in Casey might even have made the justices' intervention in
the election dispute somewhat predictable. Consistency of action
constitutes a core feature of theories about the Court's legitimacy. The
Court's adherence to its own principles makes it all the more difficult,
then, to conclude that Bush v Gore will undermine the judiciary's le-
gitimacy.
95 On December 10, CNN reported that 61 percent of those polled preferred that the
United States Supreme Court make the final decision on the selection of the next President, as
compared to 17 percent who believed Congress should make the final decision, 9 percent who
believed that the Florida State Supreme Court should make the final decision, and only 7 per-
cent who believed the Florida legislature should make the final decision. See
<http://www.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/12/10/cnn.poll> (visited Feb 24,2001).
96 Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 533-35.
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CONCLUSION
Many in legal academia welcomed Planned Parenthood v Casey
when it first appeared." I would hazard a guess that many of these
same supporters of Casey have not rushed to embrace Bush v Gore.
Yet, Casey contained the seeds-the claims to judicial supremacy and
the aggrandized notions of the Court's role in American society-that
would blossom in Bush v Gore. Indeed, one can even view the emer-
gence of the per curiam opinion-clearly the work of Justices Ken-
nedy and O'Connor-as evidence of an ultimately failed effort to re-
build the coalition that had produced the unprecedented Casey plural-
ity. As in Casey, in Bush v Gore the Court sought to end a national
debate that it feared was tearing the country apart. In fact, the Court's
chances of success were much higher in the presidential contest, in
which the political system needed a final decision on process rules,
than in the abortion debate, which has remained a controversial issue
of intense importance to many Americans for decades. It seems that if
the Court could intervene into such a contentious political debate as
abortion, and survive with its legitimacy more or less intact, then it
could safely bring the election dispute to a final conclusion as well.
97 See, for example, Kathleen Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term Forward: The Jus-
tices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv L Rev 22,24-25 (1992).
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